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Abstract
A large part of border crossing investment takes the form of international mergers
and acquisitions. In this paper, we ask how optimal repatriation tax systems look
like in a world where investment involves a change of ownership, rather than a
reallocation of real capital. We nd that the standard results of international
taxation do not carry over to the case of international mergers and acquisitions.
The deduction system is no longer optimal from a national perspective and the
foreign tax credit system fails to ensure global optimality. The tax exemption
system is optimal if ownership advantage is a public good within the multinational
rm. But the cross border cash ow tax system dominates the exemption system
in terms of optimality properties.
JEL Codes: H25, F23
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I
1 Introduction
In 1963, Peggy Brewer Richman published her famous work on the Taxation of
Foreign Investment Income. In this book, she pointed out that full taxation of
foreign income after deduction of foreign taxes paid is the optimal tax policy from
a national point of view, whereas crediting foreign taxes against domestic taxes
leads to global optimality. Richmans book and her article, Musgrave (1969), and
the following contributions like Hamada (1966) and Feldstein & Hartman (1979)
were highly inuential in shaping international taxation agreements like e.g. the
OECD convention on double taxation treaties.1
Fourty years after Richman (1963), Mihir Desai and Jim Hines (2003) challenge
this view and claim that the US government should abandon the tax credit system
for the taxation of foreign prots and switch to the exemption system. The authors
argue that the tax credit system is appropriate in a world where foreign invest-
ment reduces the domestic capital stock. In such a setting, rms decide whether
to set up new production facilities at home or abroad (greeneld investment), or
even relocate existing plants to the foreign country. Empirically, however, a large
part of foreign investment occurs in the form of mergers and acquisitions (m&a).
Foreign investment then leads to a change in the ownership of existing produc-
tion facilities, rather than a relocation of economic activity.2 In Desai & Hines
(2004), the authors argue that the current U.S. taxation of foreign prots creates
an undesirable disadvantage for American rms trying to acquire foreign rms and
conclude: e¢ ciency requires that foreign investment income face no residual tax
1Other standard references are Bond & Samuelson (1989), Bucovetsky & Wilson (1991).
Horst (1980), as well as Keen & Piekkola (1997) relax the assumption of a xed capital stock
and consider the e¤ect of taxes on savings. Grubert & Mutti (1995) consider two specic cases
of investment, portfolio investment on the one hand and R&D investment on the other hand.
However, the standard results derived by Feldstein and Hartman prevail. Janeba (1995), Mintz
& Tulkens (1996) and Davies (2003) analyze the desirability and the e¤ects of double taxation
agreements. Devereux & Hubbard (2003) derive welfare e¤ects of taxes on foreign source income
of multinational enterprises.
2As Desai & Hines (2004) put it, a very high fraction of such investment takes the form
of acquiring existing businesses. Consequently, most FDI represents transfers of control and
ownership, and need not involve transfers of net savings. (...) The modern view of FDI as
arising from productivity di¤erences among rms, with ownership changes taking the form of
FDI, raises the possibility that greater outbound FDI need not be associated with reduced domestic
investment.(p. 956)
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upon repatriation(p. 938).
From an analytical point of view, the point made by Desai & Hines (2003)
has two conceptual dimensions, see table 1. The rst dimension is the di¤erence
between the allocation of capital (often combined with the notion of greeneld
investment, i.e. creating new production facilities) as opposed to the allocation
of ownership (i.e. m&a transactions which imply purchasing existing production
facilities). The second dimension concerns the nature of the ownership advantage
which drives mergers and acquisitions. In the argument made by Desai and Hines,
foreign acquisitions do not a¤ect the number of domestic acqusitions; ownership
advantage can be thought of as being a public good within the multinational rm.
However, ownership advantage could also be a private good within the rm, and
thus scarce, which means that an additional foreign acquisition does reduce the
number of domestic acquisitions.
Capital allocation Ownershipallocation
Foreign inv. reduces
domestic inv. Richman (1963)
Foreign inv. does not
reduce domestic inv.
Desai & Hines
(2003)
Table 1: Concepts of optimal repatriation taxation.
In this paper we o¤er a framework which allows analyzing the allocation of
ownership when ownership advantage is a either public or a private good within the
multinational rm. We analyze the e¤ects of di¤erent tax regimes on international
investment and derive optimal tax policy strategies both from the national and the
global perspective. Our main interest is to nd out if the basic results and policy
recommendations generated by the standard capital mobility model carry over to
a setting with m&a rather than real capital investment. These results include the
ability of the foreign tax credit system to implement neutrality of taxes for the
location of investment and the national optimality of the deduction system.
Firstly, we nd that, if international investment is m&a and ownership is scarce,
it is not optimal for an individual country to tax foreign source income according
to the full taxation after deduction system. Secondly, in this case, the foreign
tax credit system fails to achieve globally optimal capital ows. This happens
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because an acquisition implies the transfer of an asset which produces taxable
income between two owners which may be taxed di¤erently. If the income of the
acquiring rm is taxed more heavily than the income of the seller, acquisitions are
distorted. Thirdly, the exemption system leads to overinvestment in the low tax
country, as in the Richman (1963) capital allocation model. Fourthly, national and
global welfare maximization requires a cross border cash ow tax regime. Finally,
if ownership is a public good, the exemption system satises national and global
optimality, as claimed by Desai & Hines. However, the cross-border cash-ow tax
system does so, too.
As recent surveys on the impact of taxes on cross-border capital ows, like
Devereux (2006) and Hines (1999), show, virtually all studies treat investment
ows as if they were greeneld projects.3 But, capital ows in the form of bor-
der crossing m&a are empirically important. In its World Investment Report,
UNCTAD (2006) reports cross-border m&a at a value of 716 billion dollars world-
wide in 2005, compared to 916 billion dollars of total FDI inows. Foreign acquisi-
tions of U.S. investors had a volume of 147 bn dollars whereas net outows of FDI
were only 12 bn.4
In the literature, the tax policy implications of capital ows in the form of
m&a have been neglected almost completely. An exception is a contribution by
Devereux (1990), who does not refer explicitly to mergers and acquisitions but
points out that tax distortions of ownership patterns may be important if capital
productivity depends on ownership. The paper introduces the concept of capital
ownership neutrality as a property of tax systems which avoid distortions in
ownership.5 Moreover, there are the two papers mentioned above, Desai & Hines
3Mergers and acquisitions play an important role, though, in the literature on multinational
rms and their investment behavior (including both types of investment, greeneld investment
and m&a), surveyed by Markusen (2002). Empirical evidence on m&a is reported by Andrade,
Mitchell & Sta¤ord (2001) and others.
4This discrepancy is explained by the fact that net outows are calculated by the di¤erence
between the US owned capital stocks abroad in two subsequent periods. Stocks can be reduced
by depreciation, bankruptcies etc.
Japan reports purchases of 8 bn dollars and net outows of 46 bn; the European
Union has acquisitions abroad of 626 bn dollars and outward FDI of 554 bn. (Source:
www.unctad.org/fdistatistics)
5Gordon & Bovenberg (1996) consider cross border acquisitions in a model with asymmetric
information in order to explain the correlation between savings and investment reported by
Feldstein & Horioka (1980). Fuest & Huber (2004) analyze tax policy in a model where rms
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(2003, 2004), which do not include a formal model though, and focus on U.S.
tax policy.6 To the best of our knowledge, this is the rst paper to analyse the
optimality of repatriation tax regimes in the presence of border crossing mergers
and acquisitions in a formal model.
How does taxation a¤ect m&a activity? As Auerbach & Slemrod (1997) and
Kaplan (1989) suggest, taxes may be of crucial importance for m&a investment.
There are some papers discussing the impact of the 1986 U.S. tax reform on ac-
quisitions of US rms by foreign investors. Here, the main idea is that the e¤ective
increase in the tax burden caused by the 1986 tax reform induced investors loc-
ated in countries with foreign tax credit regimes to take over U.S. rms because
the higher US taxes were credited against home country taxes (Scholes & Wolf-
son (1990), Collins, Kemsley & Shackelford (1995)). Swenson (1994) applies the
same argument to US inbound foreign direct investment and nds robust evidence
supporting the hypothesis. In a recent paper, Huizinga & Voget (2006) study the
empirical impact of international taxation schemes on m&a activity. The authors
nd robust and signicant evidence for the deterring impact of double taxation on
cross-border acquisitions.
The remainder of the paper is set up as follows. Section 2 presents the model
and the results. Section 3 discusses some extensions. In section 4, we discuss some
policy implications of our results and conclude.
2 The model
The world consists of two countries, domestic and foreign. Each country is in-
habited by a representative household. Households live for two periods. The
utility function of the representative domestic household is given by U (C1; C2) =
u(C1) + C2, where C1 and C2 are consumption in the rst and the second period
may be sold to foreign investors, but they focus on the integration of personal and corporate
income taxes, and no border crossing acquisitions take place in equilibrium. In Becker & Fuest
(2007), we consider tax competition and public goods provision when capital ows take the form
of mergers and acquisitions. Hauer & Schulte (2007) explore how tax incentives and ownership
patterns interact in a model where mergers and acquisitions can take place within and across
borders. Moreover, there are some recent m&a related contributions on the public policy and
welfare issues, like in Huck & Konrad (2004) and Hauer & Nielsen (forthcoming).
6See also the debate between Grubert (2005) and Desai & Hines (2005).
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and u(:) is strictly concave, with u0 > 0, u00 < 0. This utility function implies
that income e¤ects on rst period consumption are zero. In section 3, we show
that allowing for income e¤ects complicates the analysis without adding many new
insights. The utility function of the foreign representative household is denoted by
U (C1 ; C

2) = u
C1) + C

2 . The asterisk denotes the foreign country or location.
In period 1, the domestic (foreign) household has a given endowment of E (E)
units of a numeraire good. Households may borrow or lend in the international
capital market at the interest rate r. We abstract from residence-based taxes on
interest income; their role is also discussed in section 3.
In addition, the domestic (foreign) household owns m (m) existing and im-
mobile rms operating in the domestic (foreign) country. All domestic (foreign)
rms are initially owned by domestic (foreign) households. We refer to these rms
as national rms, as opposed to multinational rms which will be introduced be-
low. The after tax prot earned by each domestic national rm in period 2 is given
by "k(1 ) , where  is the domestic corporate income tax. Accordingly, the after
tax prot earned by each foreign national rm is given by "(1    ) , where  
is the foreign corporate income tax. Throughout the paper, we assume  >  .
In each period t, the tax revenue collected by the government is paid back to the
household sector via lump sum transfers denoted by Gt (Gt ), t = 1; 2.
Next to the national sector, there is a sector of multinational rms. The num-
ber of multinationals is normalized to unity. The representative multinational rm
has its headquarter in the domestic country and is owned by the domestic rep-
resentative household.7 The multinational considers acquisitions of rms in the
domestic or the foreign country.8
If an existing domestic (foreign) national rm is acquired, the change of owner-
ship is not accompanied by a relocation of real capital. But the ownership change
does have a real economic e¤ect. It increases the second period cash ow of the
7As we focus exclusively on the optimality properties of di¤erent repatriation tax systems,
the analysis of inbound acquisitions only complicates the notation without changing the insights
generated by the analysis.
8We assume that the acquisition targets are only domestic or foreign national rms. We thus
abstract from the possibility that a change in rm ownership occurs between multinational rms.
Adding this to the model would introduce the possibility that a domestic multinational sells a
foreign rm to another domestic multinational. We will discuss the implications of this case in
section 3.
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domestic (foreign) target rm by  (). The multinational draws  () from
uniform distributions over the intervals [ ;+] and [ ;+], respectively. The
distribution functions are denoted by 
 () and 
 (). This increase in prof-
itability is the driving force for changes in ownership in our model. It may be
interpreted as the result of cost savings due to superior technology or an increase
in output value due to access to a brand name or better distribution systems.
A key question is whether these ownership skills are a public good within the
rm, so that the rm can make acquisitions in all cases where it has an ownership
advantage, or whether the number of acquisitions is limited. A limitation of the
number of feasible acquisitions may be due to the fact that e.g. management
capacity is limited. The acquisition may also be a discrete investment. Empirically,
both types of ownership advantage are likely to exist. In the following, we rst
consider the case where ownership skills are scarce. In section 2.5, we turn to the
case where the number of acquisitons is not limited.
2.1 Investment behavior
The domestic multinational rm maximizes its market value. In the rst period,
the rm issues shares9 which are bought by the domestic representative household.
These funds are used to nance acquisitions in the domestic and in the foreign
country. The multinational rm will carry out all acquisition projects at home
(abroad) above a critical level of ownership advantage c (c). The overall
number of acquisitions is limited to a xed number N . This implies 
 (c) +

 (c) = N , so that dc + dc = 0.
How are the acquisition prices P and P  determined? We assume that the
market for target rms is perfectly competitive and focus on equilibria where the
number of acquisitions is smaller than m, i.e. some national rms remain in the
hands of their initial owners. Those initial owners who sell their rms receive their
reservation income, which is equal to "(1 )
(1+r)
 P in the case of a domestic target
rm and "
(1 )
(1+r)
 P  in the case of a foreign target rm.10 For the tax treatment
9Since we abstract from dividend taxes or capital market imperfections, nancing via share
issues is equivalent to nancing via retained earnings.
10In the extensions section, we consider the case where the initial owners receive part of the
surplus. The key results do not change.
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of acquisitions, we assume that the revenue from selling rms is untaxed and
investors cannot deduct acquisition costs from the corporate tax base. This may
be interpreted as a highly stylised way of modelling acquisitions in the form of share
deals, as opposed to asset deals. Of course, this approach abstracts from many
complexities associated with the tax consequences of mergers and acquisitions.
Given that the owners of the multinational rm will have to inject equity to
nance acquisitions, the market value of the multinational in the rst period is
given by
(1 + r)
"
V +
Z +
c
Pd+
Z +
c
(P  + T1)d
#
=
Z +
c
("+) (1  ) d+
Z +
c
[(" +) (1   )  T2] d (1)
where T1 and T2 are taxes on foreign prots paid in periods 1 and 2. This can
be rearranged to
V =
Z +
c
(1  )
(1 + r)
d+
Z +
c
 (1   )  T1(1 + r)  T2
(1 + r)
d (2)
The rm maximizes its market value by choosing c, taking into account
dc =  dc. This yields,
PO: c =
c (1  ) + T1(1 + r) + T2
1    (3)
where PO stands for private optimality. In this paper, we focus on four di¤erent
regimes for taxing foreign prots. These are
1. The exemption system: T1 = T2 = 0:
2. The full taxation after deduction system: T1 = 0; T2 =  (1   ) (" +) :
3. The foreign tax credit system: T1 = 0; T2 = (    ) (" +)
4. The cross border cash ow tax system11: T1 =  P ; T2 =  (" +) (1   ).
11The cross border cash ow tax system can equivalently be implemented by T1 = 0; T2 =
 [(" +) (1  )  (1 + r)P ] =  (1  ).See e.g. Gordon & MacKie-Mason (1995).
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2.2 The household
Consider next the budget constraint of the domestic household. Expenditures for
nancing domestic acquistions are
R +
c
"(1 )
(1+r)
d, but the cash ow from selling
these rms ows back to the domestic household. However, acquisitions of foreign
target rms including possible taxes,
R +
c
h
"(1 )
(1+r)
+ T1
i
d, have to be nanced
in addition. The budget constraint in period 1 is thus given by
C1 = E   S  
Z +
c

" (1   )
(1 + r)
+ T1

d +G1 (4)
In the second period, the household receives income from investment in the in-
ternational credit market and prot distributions from domestic and international
investment. The budget constraint in the second period can be written as
C2 = S(1 + r) +
 
m 
Z +
c
d
!
" (1  ) (5)
+
Z +
c
("+) (1  ) d+
Z +
c
[(" +) (1   )  T2] d +G2
Optimal choice of S implies u0(C1) = 1 + r. The foreign household has the
following budget constraints
C1 = E
   S +
Z +
c
" (1   )
(1 + r)
d (6)
C2 = S
 (1 + r) +
 
m  
Z +
c
d
!
" (1   ) +G2 (7)
Optimal savings by the foreign household imply u0(C1) = 1+r. Credit market
equilibrium is given by S + S = 0. The two rst order conditions for optimal
savings and the credit market equilibrium condition determine the equilibrium
values of S, Sand r, for given taxes and a given pattern of domestic and foreign
acquisitions.
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2.3 Nationally optimal taxation of foreign prots
How does an increase in foreign acquisitions made by the domestic multinational
rm a¤ect the welfare of the domestic household, and which tax policy makes
sure that foreign acquisitions maximize domestic welfare? Given that taxes are
transferred to private households via lump sum transfers, the budget constraint of
the domestic household can be written as
C1 = E   S  
Z +
c
" (1   )
(1 + r)
d (8)
C2 = S (1 + r) +m"+
Z +
c
d+
Z +
c
(" +) (1   ) d (9)
For the foreign household, rst period consumption is given by (6) and second
period consumption can be written as
C2 = S
 (1 + r) +
 
m  
Z +
c
d
!
" +  
Z +
c
(" +) d (10)
The nationally optimal foreign investment is the solution to the following max-
imization problem:
max
c
U = u (C1) + C2
subject to S =  S and 
 (c) + 
 (c) = N . Before we derive the optimal
foreign investment and the tax policy required to implement this, it is helpful to
state the following
Lemma A marginal change in the number of foreign acquisitions does not a¤ect
the interest rate r.
Proof. Di¤erentiating u0 = 1 + r and u0 = 1 + r w.r.t. S, S, c and r yields
dS
dc +
"(1 )
(1+r)
  1
u00dr = 0 and
dS
dc   "
(1 )
(1+r)
  1
u00dr = 0. With dS =  dS these
two equations can only hold if dr = 0.
This can be explained as follows. Consider an increase of foreign acquisitions
dc < 0. This increase implies that the revenue from selling rms accruing to the
foreign household in the rst period increases. The foreign household invests this
additional cash ow in the international credit market because, at a given interest
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rate, it is optimal to hold rst period consumption constant. The domestic house-
hold, in contrast, needs additional cash to nance the acquisition and therefore
reduces credit market investment by the same amount. As a result, the interest
rate remains constant.
With dS = "
(1 )
(1+r)
dc =  dS and dr = 0, a marginal change in foreign
acquisitions of the domestic multinational rm has the following e¤ect on domestic
welfare
dU
dc
= c  c (1   ) (11)
Equation (11) shows that two e¤ects determine the impact of an increase in for-
eign acquisitions (dc < 0) on national welfare.12 The rst term on the right hand
side of (11) reects that more foreign acquisitions reduce domestic acquisitions be-
cause we have assumed that ownership skills are a scarce resource ( d
c
dc =  1).
The second term on the right hand side of (11) is the increase in prots generated
by the ownership advantage. Note that this is the prot increase after foreign taxes
but before possible repatriation taxes levied by the domestic government. Taken
together, these two terms are reminiscent of the condition for nationally optimal
foreign investment derived by Feldstein and Hartman (1979), who nd that the
before tax return to domestic investment should equal the return to foreign in-
vestment after foreign taxes paid. The di¤erence is that c is only part of the
prot generated by the newly acquired rm. The overall prot is " + . This
di¤erence has implications for the optimal repatriation tax system which will be
discussed further below. At this point, we may conclude that nationally optimal
foreign investment is implied by
NO: NO =
c
1    (12)
Which tax policy is required to implement a nationally optimal investment
behaviour of domestic multinational rms? Comparing (12) to (3) reveals that
this requires a foreign cash ow tax system where T2 =  (" +) (1   ) and
T1 =   "(1 )(1+r) .13
12Note that dc > 0 implies a decrease in foreign investment.
13The same result can be achieved by implementing T1 = 0 and T2 =
 [(" +) (1  )  (1 + r)P ] =  (1  ).
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Full taxation after deduction, which is nationally optimal in the case of green-
eld investment, now leads to overtaxation of foreign investment: If T1 = 0 and
T2 =  (1   ) (" +), (3) yields
c =
c + " (1   )
1    > 
NO (13)
The reason is that, under the deduction system, the repatriation tax gives rise to
an extra tax on the acquisition. It changes the tax burden on the "unchanged"
part of the income from  " under the initial owner to [  +  (1   )] " under
the new owner. Imposing this extra burden on foreign acquisitions is not in the
interest of national income maximization. In contrast, the foreign cash-ow tax
system makes sure that the repatriation tax on prots capitalized in the purchase
price is equal to zero.
How about the remaining repatriation tax systems? The exemption of foreign
prots leads to overinvestment in the low tax country, as in the case of greeneld
investment. Finally, an interesting result can be derived for the tax credit system.
With T2 = (  )("+) in (3) the multinationals marginal foreign acquisition
satises
c = c +

    
1  

" , c ? NO (14)
Depending on " investment under the tax credit system is either too high or
too low. Concerns that crediting foreign against domestic taxes imposes an undue
burden on foreign investment projects therefore have to be qualied.
These results can be summarized as
Proposition 1 In the case of m&a investment, the cross border cash ow tax sys-
tem is nationally optimal. Under the full taxation after deduction system, foreign
investment is ine¢ ciently low. Under the tax credit system, over- or underin-
vestment may occur. The exemption system implies that foreign investment is
unambiguously too high.
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2.4 Globally optimal taxation of foreign prots
What is the globally optimal system for taxing foreign prots? As a criterion for
global optimality, we consider a utilitarian welfare function W = U + U. Note
that the assumed quasi-linearity of utility allows us to abstract from issues of
optimal income distribution across countries. The e¤ect of a change in c on
global welfare is
dW
dc
=
dU
dc
+
dU
dc
= c  c (1   ) c  (15)
While the e¤ect on domestic welfare is known from equation (11), the global
welfare e¤ect now includes the impact on the foreign country, which is represented
by the last term on the right hand side of (15). The foreign country benets from
more acquisitions because the ownership advantage leads to a higher tax revenue.
The condition for globally optimal investment by the domestic multinational rm
thus boils down to
GO = c (16)
Not surprisingly, globally optimal acquisitions imply that the gains from own-
ership changes have to be the same in the two countries, at the margin.
In the case of greeneld investment, the tax credit system implements globally
optimal investment. Does this result carry over to the case of m&a investment?
With a repatriation tax of T2 = (    )
 
" +j

, (3) leads to
c = c +

    
1  

" , c > GO (17)
It turns out that the tax credit system fails to implement global optimality in
the case of m&a investment. Again, the repatriation tax imposes an undesirable
burden on foreign acquisitions. Given that  >  , the tax credit system implies
that the new owner is subject to a tax not faced by the initial owner. As a result,
too few foreign acquisitions take place. How can global optimality be achieved?
Rearranging (3) shows that the repatriation tax which would implement global
optimality is given by
T2 = (    )c (18)
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which is di¤erent from all four regimes introduced above. Essentially, the
tax credit system has to be corrected for the inclusion of prots reected in the
purchase price. There is no easy way of implementing this because it would be
di¢ cult in practice to distinguish between hypothetical prots under the initial
owner and prots generated due to the acquisition.
What are the implications of the remaining regimes for global optimality? The
exemption system will lead to overinvestment in the low tax country, as in the
case of greeneld investment. The full taxation after deduction system yields to
underinvestment in the foreign country:
c =
c
1    +

1   "
 , c > GO (19)
Finally, the cross border cash ow tax system, with T1 =   "(1 )(1+r) and T2 =
 (" +) (1   ), leads to
c =
c
1    , 
c > GO (20)
i.e. foreign investment is ine¢ ciently low from a global perspective, too. This
is not surprising, given the national optimality of this system in the case of m&a
investment. We may thus state
Proposition 2 In the case of m&a investment, none of the four tax regimes un-
der consideration leads to global optimality. The cross border cash ow tax system,
the full taxation after deduction system and the tax credit system lead to underin-
vestment in the foreign country from a global point of view. The exemption system
implies overinvestment in the low tax country and underinvestment in the high tax
country.
The results in propositions 1 and 2 di¤er from the ndings in Desai and Hines
(2003, 2004), who argue that the exemption system is nationally and globally
optimal. Our results show that this does not apply if ownership skills are a scarce
resource. In the next section, we consider the case where ownership skills are a
public good within the rm, so that there is no limitation on the overall number
of feasible acquisitions.
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2.5 Ownership advantage as a public good within the mul-
tinational rm
So far, we have assumed that ownership skills are a scarce resource, which implies
dc
dc =  1, i.e. at the margin, either a domestic or a foreign target rm can
be acquired, but not both. How does optimal repatriation taxation look like if
ownership advantage is a public good within the rm? Recall the rm value
V =
Z +
c
(1  )
(1 + r)
d+
Z +
c
 (1   )  T1(1 + r)  T2
(1 + r)
d (21)
and maximize it without the restriction that an increase in the number of
foreign acquisitions reduces the number of domestic acquisitions. Privately optimal
foreign investment then implies
PO: c =
T1(1 + r) + T2
1    (22)
Again, we may ask how the benevolent government solves maxc U = u (C1)+
C2, this time without being restricted in the number of acquisitions. It is straight-
forward to show that both from the national and the global point of view, welfare
maximizing foreign investment requires that all projects which satisfy   0 are
carried out. Here, the exemption system does ensure national optimality. But, it
is not the only system which does so. All repatriation systems which imply zero
tax payments for the marginal foreign acquisition, with c = 0, are nationally
optimal. This includes the cross-border cash-ow tax system.
Proposition 3 If ownership advantage is a public good within the multinational
rm, the exemption system and the cross border cash ow tax system both lead to
nationally and globally optimal foreign investment.
We may thus conclude that the exemption system is optimal in the case where
ownership skills are a public good within multinational rms. For this case, our
results conrm the ndings in Desai and Hines (2003). At c = 0, the exemption
system has the same properties as the cross-border cash ow system. But the cross-
border cash-ow system has the advantage of being nationally optimal, irrespective
14
of the nature of ownership skills.14
3 Extensions
The analysis in the preceding sections is based on a highly stylised model which
uses several restrictive assumptions. In this section, we consider some extensions
and variants of the model. These include i) the existence of a residence based tax on
interest income, ii), relaxing the assumption that utility is quasilinear in second
period consumption, iii) assuming that part of the surplus from the acquisition
accrues to the initial owners of target rms through a higher purchase price, iv)
the case where domestic and foreign investor rms compete for acquiring a given
target rm, and v) the case in which foreign rms are acquired from domestic
owners. In all cases except for iv.), we return to the assumption that the overall
number of feasible acquisitions is xed.
3.1 A residence based tax on interest income
Assume that the interest income households earn in the international credit market
is subject to a residence based capital income tax denoted by  (). Acquisition
prices are now given by P = "(1 )
(1+r(1 )) and P
 = "
(1 )
(1+r(1 )) . The market value of
the multinational rm is determined by
(1 + r(1  ))
"
V +
Z +
c
Pd+
Z +
c
(P  + T1)d
#
=
Z +
c
("+) (1  ) d+
Z +
c
[(" +) (1   )  T2] d (23)
Firm value maximization yields
PO: c =
c (1  ) + T1(1 + r(1  )) + T2
1    +
(   )r
1 + r(1  )"
 (24)
Apart from changing the expression for the discount factor 1+r(1 ), the tax
14Another di¤erence is that the cash ow tax will collect tax revenue from intramarginal
projects.
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on interest income may distort acquisitions if the tax rates di¤er across countries.
For instance, if  > , the willingness to pay for an asset which generates a cash
ow " (1   ) in the second period will be higher in the foreign country than
in the domestic country because the after tax return to investment in the credit
market is lower abroad. The budget constraints of the domestic household are now
given by
C1 = E   S  
Z +
c

" (1   )
1 + r(1  ) + T1

d +G1 (25)
and
C2 = S(1 + r(1  )) +
 
m 
Z +
c
d
!
" (1  ) (26)
+
Z +
c
("+) (1  ) d+
Z +
c
[(" +) (1   )  T2] d +G2
Nationally optimal tax policy implies dU
dc = 0, which is given here by
NO: NO =
c
1    +
(   )r
1 + r(1  )"
 +
r
1   
dS
dc
How does the cross border cash ow tax system perform now? Using T1 =
  "(1 )
(1+r(1 )) and T2 =  ("
 +) (1   ) in (24) yields
c =
c
1    +
(   )r
1 + r(1  )"
 < NO (27)
since r
1 
dS
dc > 0. The cross border cash ow tax now yields too much foreign
investment because the decline in credit market investment which goes along with
the increase in foreign acquisitions gives rise to a tax revenue loss. The private
sector does not take this into account. Therefore, a higher tax on foreign prots
is required. From a global perspective, in contrast, the decline in revenue from
the tax on interest income is compensated by the fact that foreign tax revenue
increases. If  = , the globally optimal tax system does not depend on the
existence of taxes on interest income.
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3.2 No quasilinearity of the utility function
In this section, we relax the assumption that the marginal utility of second period
income is constant. Instead, assume the general utility function U = U (C1; C2).
This implies that the e¤ect of a marginal change in acquisitions on the capital
market and, hence, the interest rate is di¤erent, due to an income e¤ect which
arises.The rst order conditions for optimal savings now take the more general
form UC1 = (1 + r)UC2 and U

C1
= (1 + r)UC2 , where subscripts denote partial
derivatives. In the case of quasilinear preferences, the foreign household reacts
to a change in border crossing acquisitions by investing the additional revenue
from selling rms in the credit market because the optimal level of rst period
consumption does not change. This is true although second period consumption
of the foreign household will change by  cdc. If an additional rm is acquired
and the ownership advantage is positive, tax revenue increases. This gives rise to
an income e¤ect. If utility is not quasilinear in second period consumption, this
income e¤ect may also a¤ect rst period consumption and, hence, savings. For
instance, if rst period consumption is a normal good, the foreign household will
invest less than the additional revenue from selling rms in the credit market,
so that the interest rate will have to adjust to restore equilibrium in the credit
market. This a¤ects the nationally optimal repatriation tax policy in our model.
Recall the budget constraints in (4) and (5). Now, solve for maxc U =
U (C1; C2):
dU
dc
= UC1
 
  dS
dc
+
" (1   )
(1 + r)
 
Z +
c
" (1   )
(1 + r)2
d
dr
dc
!
+UC2

(1 + r)
dS
dc
+ S
dr
dc
+c   (" +) (1   )

(28)
Using UC1
UC2
= 1 + r and setting dU
dc = 0 this expression boils down to
c =
c +NCE dr
dc
1    (29)
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where NCE stands for domestic net capital exports, which are given by
NCE = S  
Z +
c
" (1  )
(1 + r)
d (1   ) (30)
Not surprisingly, the impact on the interest rate may change the welfare e¤ect
of a change in foreign acquisitions, depending on whether the country is a net
capital exporter or importer. It is an open question, though, whether the choice
of the tax regime, which is typically a long term decision, will be inuenced by
terms of trade considerations. It is likely that other instruments like tax rates are
more appropriate to address this issue.
3.3 Initial owners participate in the surplus
So far, we have assumed that the initial owners of existing rms do not receive
more than their reservation prot when they sell their rms. But in real world
transactions, it is likely that they do receive part of the surplus.15
Consider rstly the case of m&a when the multinational rm has to decide
between acquiring either the foreign or the domestic target rm. The surplus
generated by a domestic (foreign) acquisition, evaluated at second period prices,
is given by (1  ) or  (1   )   T1(1 + r)   T2, respectively. Assume that
the initial owners receive a share 0    1 (or 0    1) of this surplus,
so that the acquisition prices are (1 )"+(1 )
1+r
and "
(1 )+((1 ) T1(1+r) T2)
1+r
,
respectively.16 Thus, the market value is given by
V = (1  )
Z +
c
(1  )
(1 + r)
d+ (1  )
Z +
c
 (1   )  T1(1 + r)  T2
(1 + r)
d
(31)
Again, the rmmaximizes its market value by choosingc, taking into account
15This may be due e.g. to the fact that there is some room for bargaining, for reasons not
included in our model.
16Here, we assume that the investor rm has to decide rst whether to acquire the domestic or
the foreign rm before negotiating, so that the reservation prot in the bargaining game is equal
to zero. A more complicated setup would be one where bargaining with domestic and foreign
initial owners takes place simultaneously.
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dc =  dc. This yields,
PO: c =
c (1  ) + T1(1 + r) + T2
1    +

   
1  

c (1  )
(1   ) (32)
The rst term on the r.h.s. is the same as in equation (3). The second term is
equal to zero, if the share in the surplus accruing to the initial owners is equal at
home and abroad ( = ).
3.4 Domestic and foreign investor rms competing for ac-
quisitions
So far, we abstracted from the possibility that investor rms from di¤erent coun-
tries compete for the same target rm. Therefore assume that there is a second
investor rm in the foreign country. The domestic and the foreign rm bid for
a target rm located in the foreign country. Ownership advantage is assumed to
be a public good within the rm.17 In order to acquire the rm, the price the
domestic rm o¤ers has to be at least as high as the price o¤ered by the foreign
rm. The change in prots which occurs if the foreign investor acquires the target
rm is denoted by f . The target rm will be acquired by the domestic investor
if
( + ") (1   )  T1(1 + r)  T2 > (f + ") (1   )  P f max (33)
where P f max is the maximum purchase price the foreign rm is willing to
pay. This can be reduced to
  f > T1(1 + r) + T2
1    (34)
It is immediately clear that any positive tax on foreign prots of a marginal
project would imply too few foreign acquisitions of domestic investors from a global
perspective. But is this also true from a national point of view? Nationally optimal
investment implies that domestic rms should carry out the acquisition in all cases
17This allows to abstract from alternative investment opportunities. Including them would
add notation but leads to the same results.
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where
( + ") (1   )  P   0 (35)
where P  is the acquisition price. Using P  = P f max = (f + ") (1   ),
this can be reduced to
j  f  0 (36)
It turns out that nationally and globally optimal investment requires T1(1 +
r) + T2 = 0, which may be implemented either by using the exemption system or
the cross border cash ow system. This conrms the intuition in Desai and Hines
(2003, 2004) who argue that US rms may be at a systematic disadvantage when
competing for foreign acquisitions, and that this is against the national interest.
3.5 Acquisitions of foreign rms from domestic owners
So far, we have considered acquisitions of foreign rms which are initially held by
foreign owners. In this extension, we assume that the acquired rm is initially
held by another domestic owner. The main di¤erence is that the purchase price
P  is adjusted since repatriation taxes on the initial owner have to be taken into
account. With P  = " (1   )  (1 + r)T1 (")  T2 ("), equation (3) becomes
PO: c =
c (1  ) + (1 + r)T1 (c) + T2 (c)
1    (37)
Interestingly, it is straight-forward to show that the full taxation after deduc-
tion system is optimal from a national point of view, and that the tax credit sys-
tem is optimal from a global perspective. For m&a transactions between domestic
owners, the standard results are still valid. The case where domestic multinational
rms trade foreign rms among themselves may be of secondary importance em-
pirically. But it becomes clear that the optimality properties of repatriation taxes
depend critically on the tax status of the buyer and the seller, not just the type of
investment.
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4 Discussion and concluding remarks
In the preceding sections, we have analyzed the e¤ects of taxes on international
capital ows when investment is m&a instead of real capital relocation. It has
been shown that the tax e¤ects may be quite di¤erent from the e¤ects emerging
in the standard capital mobility model. Table 2 briey summarizes the results.
Capital allocation Ownershipallocation Capital allocation
Ownership
allocation
Foreign inv. reduces
domestic inv.
Full taxation after
deduction
Cross border cash
flow
Foreign inv. reduces
domestic inv. Tax credit system -
Foreign inv. does not
reduce domestic inv. -
Exemption or
Cross border cash
flow
Foreign inv. does not
reduce domestic inv. -
Exemption or
Cross border
cash flow
Globally optimal tax policyNationally optimal tax policy
Table 2: Optimal repatriation tax systems.
What are the policy implications of the analysis? Firstly, the traditional focus
on the tax credit system in double taxation agreements and international tax co-
ordination proposals, e.g. within the EU, may be misguided. It is based on the
assumption that the geographical location of investment matters for its productiv-
ity whereas corporate ownership structures do not. In the real world, however,
corporate ownership structures are crucial for the exploitation of synergies, for
access to technological and administrative know-how and for the solution of cor-
porate governance problems. In an increasingly knowledge based economy with
declining communication and transport costs, these factors are likely to gain im-
portance relative to the geographical location of production facilities. If this is
correct, tax distortions of ownership structures deserve more attention.
Secondly, our results are relevant for the current tax policy debate in the U.S.,
the U.K. and other countries considering reforms of their repatriation tax sys-
tems.18 Our ndings conrm the view expressed by Desai and Hines (2003, 2004)
that the tax credit system may not be optimal in cases where foreign investment
takes the form of mergers and acquisitions. But, we also show that the exemption
system is only optimal if ownership advantage is a public good within the rm.
18The U.K. government has recently published a document suggesting that the U.K. should
switch to the exemption system at least for large multinational corporations, see H.M. Treasury
(2007).
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Interestingly, the current tax policy debate in some countries, e.g. Germany,
points into the opposite direction. The fact that foreign prots are exempt from
domestic taxes is often criticized because the exemption system is seen as creat-
ing incentives for German rms to invest abroad, where taxes are lower, rather
than at home. A switch to a tax credit system is seen as benecial for domestic
economic activity. The results derived in this paper point to neglected potential
costs associated with such a move. Currently, Germany is the country of residence
of many headquarters of multinational rms. Higher taxes on foreign prots of
domestic rms would create incentives to sell foreign subsidiaries to multinational
rms residing in other countries19 although this is not in the national interest.
Thirdly, our results di¤er to what Desai and Hines (2003, 2004) suggest in two
important aspects. In the case where investors decide whether to acquire a rm at
home or abroad, the tax credit system does not necessarily imply that there are
too few acquisitions from a national point of view; there may be too many as well.
Moreover, the exemption system leads to overinvestment abroad. In this case, the
cross border cash ow system is optimal from a national point of view.20
A fourth implication of our results is that the optimality properties of taxes on
foreign prots, both from a national and a global point of view, crucially depend on
the type of investment. Many real world investment projects will include elements
of both, real capital investment and acquisition. National optimality or neutrality
of the tax system for all types of capital ows therefore seems hard to achieve.
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